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BECOMING GLOBAL LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CIVIC PROFESSIONALISM
John Bliss *

ABSTRACT
Through their professional education and training, new lawyers are generally encouraged to
adopt a civic vision of professional identity. This article explores convergences and diverges in
how new lawyers entering an increasingly globalized legal profession conceive of their civic
roles in different national contexts. In particular, I examine corporate lawyers-in-training in the
U.S. and China, drawing on interviews and a cross-cultural identity mapping method to compare
their accounts of the lived experiences of civic professionalism. I find that professional identity
formation in the U.S. sample is largely marked by role distancing and a sense of constrained
public-interest expression. In contrast, Chinese respondents generally identified strongly with
their civic roles, while framing their public contributions in pragmatic, state-aligned terms. I
conclude with a comparative analysis of young lawyers’ bottom-up efforts to expand their civic
impact.
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INTRODUCTION
The value of my existence (存在的价值) depends on how much
contribution I can make to others, or to the society, or to the whole human
race. This probably is my core identity (最核心的身份) . . . . All other
roles are just an extension of this core role as a contributor (贡献者).
The above interview excerpt from “Hu,” a young Chinese corporate lawyer, suggests a
deeply public-regarding vision of the lawyer role. This article compares what being a
“contributor” means to lawyers-in-training like Hu in the U.S. and China. To gain insights into
globalized convergences around the civic dimension of professional identity, I focus on the elite
corporate law sector where new lawyers have extensive contact with international norms and
values. In China, the transnational corporate practice sector is evident in the widespread
American and other foreign law firms as well as major Chinese domestic firms, which largely
import the structures and practices of foreign-firm counterparts (Liu 2008, 786-87). Do new
Chinese lawyers in these firms internalize and translate foreign norms of civic professionalism,
or do they present a more distinctly Chinese model rooted in domestic politics and authoritarian
legality? More generally, how do young lawyers’ accounts of professional identity reflect their
bottom-up efforts to advance the public interest within the constraints of their national legal and
political contexts?
I address these questions through bilingual interviews and a cross-cultural identitymapping methodology. Although exploratory and qualitative, examining only a slice of the bar in
both countries and only a moment in the professional socialization timeline, my qualitative
analysis provides insights and new directions for comparative research on the globalizing legal
profession.
My findings suggest sharp differences in how U.S. and Chinese respondents perceive the
public-service value of corporate law practice and more broadly how they experience the civic
dimension of professional identity. As I have described in previous writings on the U.S. side of
this study, American corporate lawyers-in-training often experience “divided selves,” a personal
and civic detachment from professional identity (Bliss 2017). This tension with respect to
perceived constraints on public-interest expression is, I argue, a defining feature of the lived
experience of civic professionalism among many U.S. corporate-lawyers-in-training. I add this
sense of civic constraint to what I take to be the existing definition of civic professionalism
found in American legal profession scholarship, wherein lawyers have a professional
responsibility to serve the public good as client-centered neutral partisans and as guardians of an
independent legal system that moderates state power. While U.S. respondents’ sense of
constraint and sometimes alienation in their corporate law practice raises concerns about mental
health and intrinsic job satisfaction, I argue that it can also support bottom-up legal reform
efforts via the legal profession.
In contrast, Chinese respondents more often described corporate law practice in morally
favorable terms. Their perception that corporate lawyers make positive civic contributions
appeared to bring these lawyers a strong sense of purpose and personal investment in their early
legal careers. Indeed, I argue that young corporate lawyers in the China sample approximated a

moderate “integrated cause lawyering identity” (Bliss 2017, 872), wherein respondents generally
located the lawyer role in the center of their identity maps and described modest contributions to
developing the economy and the rule of law. Respondents rarely framed these civic
commitments in the liberal rhetoric of promoting the profession’s independence, developing civil
society and democratic political structures, or advancing legal and social change.
This stark variation between how U.S. and Chinese corporate-lawyers-in-training think
about civic professionalism is perhaps surprising given that, in many respects, they belong to the
same transnational corporate bar. The Chinese respondents were employed either by foreign
firms or domestic firms in the mold of foreign firms. They had proximity to foreign clients,
foreign legal actors, and foreign legal concepts. Twelve of the thirty Chinese respondents studied
abroad for LLM degrees. When asked about their general impressions of lawyers, they often
cited foreign media images. Chinese law schools have undergone dramatic internationalization
efforts (Wang et al. 2016). Daily life in Shanghai, where all of the Chinese interviews were
conducted, consists of a global mix of international people, business, products, food, and
language. English is prevalent in the daily written and spoken language of these lawyers’
workplaces.
In spite of these internationalization trends, my findings suggest marked divergence in
the U.S. and China samples. I conclude with a comparative analysis of the civic dimension of
professional identity. In the U.S. sample, professional identities were generally divided,
constrained, and unstable, while the Chinese sample tended to present central, state-aligned, and
stable professional selves. I label the Chinese model “pragmatic professionalism” to emphasize
that it is an affirmatively civic vision of lawyer identity that lacks bottom-up frustration but
instead draws on a pragmatic recognition of the limited role of lawyers in the legal and political
order. I argue that evaluation of the competing merits of these country-specific models should
avoid the ethical and empirical deficits (the “unwitting hegemonism”) behind U.S.-led
liberalization and rule-of law efforts (Alford 2000). As the Chinese system of authoritarian
governance and legality gains global prominence, the Chinese model of legal professionalism
cannot be dismissed merely as a target for diffusion of American norms.
IDEOLOGIES OF CIVIC PROFESSIONALISM IN THE U.S. BAR
The standard U.S. conception of the lawyer role emphasizes zealous advocacy for clients
in support of the adversarial legal process. This client-centered vision is complemented by a
tradition of (at least rhetorically) robust public commitments, where lawyers serve as “officers of
the court” and “lawyer statesmen” (Kronman 1995). Lawyers are tasked with not only providing
technical legal analysis but also judgment and wise counseling of clients (Wilkins 1998, 1528).
Practitioners are invited to pursue the lawyer role as a calling, either in the framework of cause
lawyering, where the lawyer explicitly seeks to realize a personal vision of the good society, or
in the framework of neutral-partisan client service, where the lawyer provides access to justice as
a precondition for a functional democracy (Pepper 1986, 617; Spaulding 2003).
This perspective on lawyer identity has deep roots in what Halliday (1999) refers to as an
American tradition of “civic professionalism” drawing on lawyers’ “altruistic, prosocial,

humanistic, and other-regarding motivations.” Historians trace civic professionalism to the early
American legal profession before the Civil War, when lawyers were heavily represented in
public office as well as serving as country attorneys who provided access to justice (Auerbach
1977). This public-service tradition finds further support in American lawyers’ prominent roles
as civil rights leaders, legal change agents in the common law system, and, more generally,
“societal problem solvers” (Edley 2012). These ideals are said to be reproduced through U.S.
legal education where students are socialized into a professional collective based on a shared
identity and an obligation to serve the public.
Commentators have lamented the growing commercialization of legal practice and the
decline of the lawyer-statesman ideal (Kronman 1995). This lament features prominently in the
recent wave of research and commentary on U.S. legal education, which stresses the importance
of inculcating students in “civic professionalism” and a sense of duty to “the members of the
public the profession is pledged to serve” (Sullivan et al. 2007, 4).
In sum, the ideal American professional identity presented to new U.S. lawyers, and
perhaps offered for export to developing countries, frames lawyers as public-regarding
professionals who internalize a sense of civic purpose in their representation of clients and in
their leadership in legal and social reform. As a collective, these lawyers are expected to work
within the channels of the liberal legal order to provide a semi-autonomous alternative to the
market and state.
IDEOLOGIES OF CIVIC PROFESSIONALISM IN THE CHINESE BAR
Western observers frequently suggest that legal professionalism in China is compromised
by guanxi relations (reciprocal networks of relationships that span personal, legal, and political
arenas) and state oversight, such that Chinese lawyers “have not developed a strong professional
identity independent of the desire to get good work and stay out of trouble” (McMorrow 2010,
1102). The state supervises legal practice, as evident in the required party cells in law firms, state
control over bar associations, and the oath to the Party taken by new entrants to the bar. This
supervision contrasts with the liberal notion of an independent, self-regulating collective of
professionals. Lawyers’ neutrality is filtered through the “socialist rule of law,” creating a
"fundamental conflict of interest between lawyers' loyalty to the state and their loyalty to their
clients” (Michelson 2006, 30). This conflict may be most visible among criminal defense
lawyers and other lawyers who take controversial cases where they can face personal liability.
Some recent scholarship has highlighted emerging but limited norms of professional
independence in the Chinese bar. These norms have been influenced by lawyers’ mobilization
around recent cases where lawyers have been prosecuted (Alford 2010; Liu et al. 2014). In
addition to defending the legal profession, these movements have included a growing
commitment to pro bono practice, spurred by global markets and rhetorical campaigns and
policies of the Ministry of Justice and the All China Lawyers Association (Dong 2016). These
pro bono contributions generally consist of charitable donations and education projects rather
than legal representation (Dong 2016), although pro bono legal representation within the
framework of state legal aid initiatives is publicly celebrated (Stern and Liu 2020, 241). As
reflected in interview excerpts discussed below, Chinese lawyers are also frequently called on to
provide informal pro bono legal services to friends and family (Stern 2013, 155-56).

A great deal of scholarly and media attention has been paid to China’s cause lawyers, or
“rights protection” (维权) lawyers as they are generally labeled. These lawyers are often framed
as the harbingers of political liberalization, although researchers offer a more modest portrait of
their impact. It may even be strategically advantageous for Chinese cause lawyers to be
moderate, politically embedded, explicitly patriotic (Michelson 2007; Fu and Cullen 2008; Liu
and Halliday 2011; Stern 2013). Yet, a minority of Chinese lawyers are “motivated by cause
rather than cash” and attracted to the “idealistic identity” of being a “rights-defending hero”
(Stern 2013, 51). Lawyers who match this description appear to adopt a similar professional
identity to U.S. cause lawyers, who aspire to find in their careers “something to believe in”
(Scheingold and Sarat 2004, 51).
While this body of literature has increasingly examined Chinese corporate law offices
(Liu 2006; Liu 2008; Li and Liu 2012; Liu and Wu 2016; Stern and Li 2016; Liu and Wilkins
forthcoming), researchers have yet to empirically study how new lawyers in this sector are
influenced by liberal understandings of civic professionalism. Foreign efforts to promote
political liberalism in China via the legal profession have been fostered by development
organizations, banks, aid agencies, private foundations, bar associations, universities, and U.S.
congressional, judicial, and executive branches, prominently President Clinton’s 1997 “China
Rule of Law Initiative” (Carothers 2006; Erie 2009). Robust funding for these activities became
available beginning in 2002 (Stephenson 2006). The development community behind these
initiatives has been criticized for assuming that spreading the “legal language of globalization”
will facilitate the rise of global capitalism and that reform in corporate law will “spill over” into
the development of rule-of-law (Dezalay and Garth 2011). Regarding China, this Trojan Horse
strategy is summarized by Matthew Stephenson (2006) as follows:
[T]he Chinese will adopt an initial set of legal reforms and legal education
programs in order to achieve economic goals, and [those] reforms, once adopted,
will take on a life of their own. The growth of legal methods for dealing with
commercial disputes will foster a culture of legality that will spread beyond
economic transactions to other areas. Because the same judicial institutions and
legal profession that handle commercial issues also handle other types of legal
issues, improving training and organization will lead to improvements in all areas,
even if the original motivation is strictly economic. And the success of legal
reforms in the commercial area will strengthen the hand of reformers in China
who want to push for legal reforms in other areas.
Skeptics have long suggested that the Trojan Horse model relies on an unrealistic
assumption that the legal complex is a “machine that runs itself,” which will automatically
“trigger a chain reaction transforming economic liberalization into political and social reform”
(Silverstein 2003).
Trojan Horse efforts may currently be losing potency as the Chinese model of law and
politics ascends as a coherent vision of authoritarian legality (Gallagher 2017). While the U.S.
has sought to “plant seeds in patches of sunlight” through commercial law reform, the Chinese
leadership has effectively set up “institutional firewalls” around areas of legal reform considered
off limits (Stephenson 2006). As Sida Liu notes, the narrative that the Chinese legal order is

transforming from “the rule of guanxi” to “the rule of law” does not match the reality of what has
become “a strong Chinese state underneath the structural outlook of a market economy” (Liu
2011). This view is bolstered by Xi Jinping’s recent efforts to position China as a global
epicenter, which rejects Western norms and instead pursues a “Chinese dream” (中国梦) and a
Belt and Road foreign policy of increasing influence abroad. Taisu Zhang and Tom Ginsburg
(2019) have argued that although President Xi frames himself as a “champion of law and
legalization” he does so primarily as a self-legitimating strategy while seeking to limit the rule of
law in practice. In the legal profession, Xi’s rule has brought tightening control over lawyers’
independence and more explicit ideological training in the “socialist rule of law” and Party
loyalty (Stern and Liu 2020).
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
Edited volumes compiling research on the legal professions of various countries have
provided rich resources for comparative insights into the globalizing legal profession (i.e. Abel
and Lewis 1989; Sarat and Scheingold 2001; Dezalay and Garth 2011; Cummings, De Sa e
Silva, Trubek forthcoming). These volumes have included a substantial focus on the
transnational corporate law bar in particular (Wilkins et al. 2017; Cunha et al. 2018; Liu and
Wilkins forthcoming). Yet, it is rare that we include multiple legal professions within the same
empirical study, drawing on the same research questions and methods to create direct
comparisons. Such research designs face formidable challenges in dealing with cultural and
linguistic differences in addition to the wide range of confounding variables (e.g., with respect to
systems of education, governance, and law) introduced when analyzing social phenomena across
countries. For the primarily theory-generating purposes of this qualitative study, this broad scope
of cross-national variation can be advantageous and can help shape narrower research questions
for future inquiry. This article wades into these waters by employing cross-cultural methods: a
visual identity-mapping exercise and a bilingual approach to research interviews and analysis.
China offers a strategic site for examining how professional identity formation is
globalizing. Emerging economies have been a source of dramatic growth in the global legal
profession. Nowhere has this growth been more pronounced than China. The number of lawyers
in the People’s Republic of China has grown roughly one-hundred fold in the past four
decades—from just 3,000 in 1980 when the legal profession was formally revived to nearly
300,000 in 2017 (Minzner 2013; Stern 2013).
I focus on the corporate law sector in both countries to support commensurability in the
U.S.-China comparison, although I also discuss some structural variations in these firms’ training
and advancement programs (Liu 2008). These elite corporate-lawyers-in-training are not
representative of the full bar in either country. The U.S. legal profession has long been
characterized by a division into two hemispheres, one serving large organizations and the other
serving individual clients (Heinz and Laumann 1982). This division has become less distinct
over time (Heinz et al. 1998), yet the large-firm corporate law sector has increasingly departed
from other practice settings in terms of compensation. New lawyers in large firms earn roughly
double the incoming salaries offered by small firms and triple what new lawyers earn in solo
practice, government, public interest, and legal aid (Dinovitzer et al. 2004).

The Shanghai respondents’ international orientation, elite educational credentials, and
foreign-facing practice settings make them good candidates for investigating the globalization of
professional norms. Yet these very traits distinguish them from the mainstream of lawyers in the
Chinese bar, many of whom suffer from acute “economic and institutional vulnerabilities” that
are absent in transnational corporate practice (Michelson and Liu 2010, 311).
Throughout this article, my presentation of the U.S. data is abridged and I cite to my
previous publications on the American sample for more detailed analysis (Bliss 2017; Bliss
2018). The Chinese portion of the study was designed as an extension of the U.S. project,
applying a Mandarin-language adaptation of the same interview protocol and identity mapping
method. All interviews referenced in this article were conducted by the author.
The U.S. study draws on longitudinal interviews and identity mapping with three cohorts
of law students and young lawyers. The earliest cohort was followed with interviews through
their first three years of practice. These respondents all attended the same top-tier law school.
While the study included respondents who pursued other career tracks, this article focuses on the
39 respondents who interned at large corporate law firms, including respondents in the first
cohort whom I continued to interview in their post-graduation jobs in large firms. Four
respondents from the earliest cohort did not complete an identity map and so are excluded from
any counts in the below identity map analysis.
Most U.S. respondents were recruited by requesting their volunteer participation through
in-person announcements in first-year classes. This approach was supplemented by a small
amount of snowball sampling.
The China sample consisted of 30 corporate law associates who were in their first three
years of practice at elite law firms in Shanghai. For this comparative extension of the U.S. study,
I initially considered sampling Chinese law students rather than young Chinese lawyers, given
that my U.S. data consists of more law student interviews (104) than post-JD follow-up
interviews (49). However, after conducting a pilot study, I concluded that focusing on legal
education in China would miss most of the professional socialization process. Many young
Chinese lawyers completed their legal studies at the undergraduate level, which focused on black
letter law with few experiential elements and little expectation that graduates will become
lawyers. For these lawyers, their first substantial exposure to the profession occurs on the job.
U.S. law students in contrast undergo a deliberate professional socialization program including
experiential education and supervised legal practice opportunities. Comparing Chinese law
students to U.S. law students would likely prove unfruitful for a study of professional identity
formation. Instead, I sampled new Chinese lawyers, who are undergoing on-the-job socialization,
and U.S. law students and new lawyers whose professional socialization begins in law school
and continues in their first positions as lawyers.
The China sample is evenly split between lawyers working for elite Chinese domestic
firms (15 respondents) and those working for elite foreign firms (15 respondents). Respondents
were employed by a total of five domestic firms and six foreign firms. Of the six foreign firms,
two are headquartered in the U.S., two are structured as multinational Swiss vereins, and two are
headquartered in Europe. Firms in both categories draw top law students, offer attractive salaries,

handle large entity clients, and have expertise in international legal matters. The domestic firms
in many respects imitate foreign firms, as observed by Sida Liu (2008, 786-87):
From minor issues such as document settings and website design to more
substantive aspects such as billing method and management structure, these
Chinese law ﬁrms want to look similar to the Anglo-American mega–law ﬁrms in
almost every way, even ﬁrm size.
The China interviews were conducted during two data collection trips to Shanghai in
2015 and 2016. Respondents were primarily recruited with the help of gatekeepers at law firms
(generally law firm partners) and direct queries on lawyer-specific WeChat groups. The
interviews were held in a confidential setting. Pilot interviews were conducted in respondents’
offices. The subsequent interviews for the study were mostly held in a meeting room at the
Harvard Center Shanghai. As in the U.S. study, interviews were recorded with respondents’
consent. The characteristics of the China sample are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Chinese sample characteristics (n=30)
Gender
Law Firm Type
Graduate Studies

Male
Female
Domestic
Foreign
Foreign LLM
Domestic master’s in law
None

14
16
15
15
12
6
12

The semi-structured interview protocol in the China study largely mirrored the U.S.
protocol—focusing on entrance into the profession, sense of professional purpose, civic
contributions, legal education and training, and professional and personal identities. The Chinese
interviews were conducted in Mandarin. Interview data was coded and analyzed by the author
with research and language assistance from two law students at Koguan Law School and one at
Harvard Law School.
Mid-way through each interview, I introduced the identity-mapping exercise that I first
developed in the U.S. portion of this study (Bliss 2017). This method provides visual
representations of how one’s professional role relates to one’s broader self-concept. Underlying
this method is a Goffmanesque theory of role distancing and personal identity, which emphasizes
the continual alignment of roles on a spectrum, some roles being more proximate, embraced, and
central constituents of identity, and others more distant and detached (Goffman 1959). The first
step in the exercise is to list all of the roles one enacts in daily life. The only role that
respondents were specifically asked to include was “lawyer.” I then handed the respondent a
sheet of paper with a large circle representing the respondent’s identity. Respondents then drew
and labeled smaller circles on this identity map representing each of their roles—placing roles
that felt constitutive and self-expressive closer to the center and roles that felt less essential to
one’s identity further from the center. This exercise was followed by a 15- to 30-minute
interpretive dialogue in which respondents discussed the placement and labelling of their roles.

As evident in the examples below, this exercise provides visual cross-cultural data as well as
helping to open interview discussions of abstract, personal, and somewhat politically sensitive
questions about professional identity.
All identifying references have been eliminated in order to maintain participant
confidentiality. Respondents have been randomly assigned pseudonyms. For the China sample,
these pseudonyms are drawn from a list of common Chinese surnames.
U.S. FINDINGS: CONSTRAINED, DIVIDED, AND UNSTABLE PROFESSIONAL
SELVES
This section builds on my earlier-published analysis of how U.S. corporate-lawyers-intraining form professional selves. Here, I concentrate on the civic dimension of professional
identity (Sullivan et al. 2007). Many U.S. respondents in my sample entered law school with
what I label a cause-lawyering identity profile, where the lawyer role was central in their identity
maps and overlapping with personal and political roles. When describing their motivation for
attending law school, these respondents emphasized their strong political orientations and the
civic and social-change capacities of the legal profession (Stover 1989; Granfield 1992).
However, in their second year of law school, those respondents who had accepted positions in
elite corporate law firms generally came to locate the lawyer role in a more peripheral position in
their identity maps (Bliss 2017) amid accounts of instrumental professional identity. Rather than
pursuing a public-interest calling, they described their upcoming positions as primarily motivated
by income. See, for example, Sara’s identity map from her second year in law school (Figure 1),
after she had accepted an internship in a large corporate law firm (“Big Law”) that would lead to
a post-graduation job at the firm.

Figure 1. U.S. identity map: Sara

After paying down her debt for several years in a law firm, Sara hoped to return to
what she labeled in Figure 1, “Impact Litigation/Civil Rights Lawyer.” Notice that the “Big
Law” role is completely outside the identity circle. In the interview, she explained that this
job lacks public-interest value and does not reflect on her identity. Her “biggest concern”
was that she would become “addicted to money” and find it difficult to leave corporate law
practice.
This disappointment with the corporate law path was common in the U.S. sample,
particularly among students who began law school with public-interest sector ambitions. As
these students met elite-firm recruiters during the on-campus hiring program at the beginning of
the second year of law school, they often moderated their judgment toward these firms, although
some respondents continued to hold profoundly negative views (Bliss 2018, 2010-12). In spite of
their reservations, many of these respondents took positions in large firms. Following the
acceptance of these job offers, these respondents often adopted a pessimistic view of their
upcoming professional identities, as one student concluded: “I don’t even want to be a lawyer
anymore. Everything these [large-firm lawyers] do sounds unappealing” (Bliss 2018, 2012).
Students who emphasized a lack of civic calling in corporate law practice generally
continued to offer similar accounts in the post-JD interviews (Bliss 2018, 1981). When asked
about their sense of professional purpose, these lawyers emphasized ethical contributions to
clients and the legal system; however, these contributions often fell far short of their initial
expectations for civic engagement. They emphasized political identities and a desire to

contribute to large-scale social, political, and legal reform, but felt that those values were
disconnected from their current legal practice. Instead, many of these respondents suggested that
their own emphasis on ethical client service was merely a post-hoc rationalization for the
decision to “drift” to a corporate law firm instead of starting their careers in public-interest
practice settings (Granfield 1992). Thus, one respondent who cited the adversarial
professionalism ideal (that “everyone deserves a defense, even corporate clients”) for his
decision to work in a large firm quickly clarified: “That’s probably just a justification for myself
so I don’t have to feel like a sellout” (Bliss 2018, 2020).
Pro bono opportunities seemed to alleviate some of this disappointment with the civic
significance of working in corporate law. Amid the institutionalization of pro bono programs in
large U.S. law firms, associates are incentivized to meet pro bono hour targets (Cummings and
Rhode 2009). In this process, pro bono coordinators often put great care into matching
associates to pro bono cases that suit the individual associate’s values and interests while
avoiding “difficult” clients and legal matters (Bliss and Boutcher forthcoming). However,
respondents’ heavy emphasis on pro bono when discussing their civic contributions was often
associated with their underlying view that their service to firms’ paying clients was not socially
beneficial.
Some of these frustrations were rooted in external constraints on associates’ civic
professionalism resulting from their relative lack of autonomy, control over clients, and
opportunities for pro bono service. But I also find evidence in the U.S. sample of internal
constraints on civic professionalism. Some respondents described their legal practice in
transactional terms as business careers with primarily remunerative value. Others held onto an
image of themselves as cause lawyers and planned to return to public-interest practice after a few
years in large firms, but they explained that they had little interest in attempting to express their
civic values in large-firm practice. Instead, they had developed “divided selves,” where the
performance of a professional role was described primarily as a matter of passing in a corporate
law environment until a future date when they could return to a more central professional
identity as a public-interest attorney.
Other U.S. respondents seemed to push back against external constraints on civic
expression within corporate law practice, proactively seeking out opportunities to engage in, for
example, pro bono, diversity, and environmental sustainability efforts. In the same spirit, some
respondents emphasized their duty to steer powerful clients toward ethical and socially beneficial
behavior. These bottom-up efforts from young lawyers may influence their firms’ continued
priority on pro bono and corporate social responsibility. Indeed, large U.S. firms often cite the
civic dimension of corporate law practice as a key ingredient in recruiting and retaining talented
young lawyers (Rhode 2009).
U.S. respondents tended to express dissatisfaction with their current placement of the
lawyer role, particularly when the lawyer role was located on the far periphery of their identity
maps. This desire to move the lawyer role inward was made visually apparent in some of the
U.S. identity maps, where arrows and others markings indicated an intention or hope that the role
placement would change in the future (see, e.g., Sara’s chronological arrows in Figure 1 above,
which express her hope to inhabit a more central lawyer role when she later changes jobs).

Respondents often explained this instability in their professional role alignments as a function of
their lack of civic expression and intrinsically rewarding work.
In summary, U.S. corporate lawyers-in-training often struggled fundamentally with a
tension between their desire for public-interest outlets and their limited opportunities for such
outlets in their daily practice. To some extent this struggle may reflect an inherent tension in the
stated American ideals of professional identity, where lawyers are expected to serve as client
agents (holding one’s own morality in abeyance) while also playing a robust public role as
officers of the court and lawyer statesman. This tension is heightened for young corporate
lawyers who came to the profession seeking to reform market, state, and legal systems, but who
feel that corporate law practice instead reinforces these systems.
For some of these lawyers-in-training, frustration with the limited public-service outlets
available in their daily practice can motivate bottom-up efforts to expand civic commitments in
the corporate law sector. But these lawyers’ experiences of “divided selves” also raise concerns
about job satisfaction, mental health, and the pipeline into these firms (Bliss 2017). This sense of
constrained civic expression emerges from my analysis as a defining feature of the lived
experience of civic professionalism among many U.S. corporate-lawyers-in-training.
CHINA FINDINGS: INTEGRATED, PRAGMATIC, AND STABLE PROFESSIONAL
SELVES
The Chinese respondents did not generally present the tension with professional identity
found in the U.S. sample. 90% of the Chinese respondents located the lawyer role in what I
coded as a central and integrated cluster in their identity maps (27 of 30 respondents). Only 17%
of U.S. respondents who completed one or two identity maps located the lawyer role in a central
cluster in any of their maps (6 of 35 respondents). The Chinese maps were more stable than
found in the U.S. sample. When asked whether they hoped the roles in their identity maps would
move in the future, Chinese respondents generally expressed satisfaction with their current role
alignments. This stands in sharp contrast to the unstable and dissatisfied professional selfportraits in the U.S. sample. Among the multiple interpretations of this variation, respondents in
both the U.S. and China samples emphasized their relationship to the civic dimension of
professionalism. In contrast to the U.S. experience of frustrated civic self-expression, the China
sample was largely satisfied regarding their degree of civic engagement. Chinese respondents
offered a far more optimistic view of the public contributions of corporate law practice. In this
section, I break down Chinese respondents’ accounts of civic professionalism into contributions
to clients, the legal system, and society (Heineman et al. 2014). I then discuss how these
respondents described their internal constraints on civic expression.
i.

Contributions to Clients

In the recent Chinese context, scholars suggest that the professional responsibility
principles of neutrality and partisanship are filtered through the “socialist rule of law,” which
requires that lawyers “serve the interests of the state above all else” (Michelson 2006, 30).
According to the 1997 Lawyers Law, lawyers are not liable for opinions rendered as a client’s
agent. In practice, however, Chinese lawyers can run the risk of personal liability, especially

when representing politically controversial clients (Liu and Halliday 2016). Young corporate
lawyers in Shanghai may be somewhat exempt from these political interferences with client
loyalty. When asked about their relationships to clients, respondents consistently described
notions of neutrality, fiduciary duties, and confidentiality standards. My methods do not give me
access to actual relationships between these lawyers and their clients. Furthermore, young
Chinese associates in foreign firms in particular have little contact with clients (Bliss
forthcoming). However, the consistent inclination of respondents in the China sample to
elaborate on client-centered legal ethics suggests sincere engagement with these values.
Chinese respondents generally downplayed the notion of governmental oversight in their
daily practice. Guo, for example, explained the marginal role of the Party cell in his firm as
follows:
We have a party cell (党支部) . . . the head of [the Party cell] is an office manager
and is not very powerful. She doesn’t care about politics . . . . The Party cell is not
very active. Having a party cell is just to comply with the legal requirement.
This lack of concern about political risks was also evident in respondents’ approach to the
research interviews. Given the scholarly and media reporting on repression in the Chinese bar, it
is perhaps surprising that all but one Chinese respondent consented without hestitation to being
recorded for the research interviews. These respondents generally skimmed the Chineselanguage consent document and promptly signed. Unlike cause lawyers in China, who are
subjected to “unpredictable flashes of repression [that] instill fear and amplify silence,” Chinese
corporate lawyers appear to carry out their professional obligations to clients (or at least to
conceive of such obligations) without a great deal of concern about governmental oversight
(Stern and Hassid 2012, 1231). More generally, previous research has suggested that Chinese
lawyers’ experiences of political and state supervision are contingent on their practice settings
(Stern and Hassid 2012, 1245).
ii.

Contributions to the Legal System

In their discussion of client service, the Chinese respondents generally included broader
considerations of their duties to the legal system. Wu, for example, expressed his faith that
client-centered practice is vital to the legal order: “You have to put aside your personal values to
be a good lawyer, and in this way justice as a whole will be served.” While the Chinese
respondents emphasized some challenges in setting aside personal values, they strongly
prioritized their commitment to contributing to the healthy functioning of the legal system. Hu
explained:
Within the limits of the law, I would like to add my personal values to the legal
advice I give to my clients. However, of course I would not twist what the law
really means and tell the client the version of the law that I wish existed.
Although I did not ask questions specifically dealing with corruption, several Chinese
respondents mentioned their desire to counteract corruption in the legal system, as Huang
explained: “Most lawyers in my firm feel that they have a role in reforming law…by interacting

with judges in non-corrupt ways.” Some of these comments specifically cited a commitment to
eschewing guanxi (reciprocal relationship networks). Following the privatization of the bar in the
1990s, scholars suggest that “lawyers’ individual-level guanxi helped fill the void left in the
wake of retreating organizational-level support . . . by mobilizing microlevel political
connections” (Michelson 2007, 353). On this point, several respondents in this study
distinguished Shanghai’s cosmopolitan corporate law practice as an exception to China’s
generally relationship-based legal norms. Qian explained: “Shanghai is very advanced in the rule
of law (法治); however in many other areas of China, it’s usually rule by people (人治) rather
than rule of law.” While this study does not provide empirical evidence of whether these
respondents are accurate in their assessment of the Shanghai bar’s distinctive commitment to the
rule of law, it is important to note here that these respondents often included concerns for the
legitimacy of the legal system within their conceptions of professional identity. Generally, these
lawyers did not appear to be advocating liberal rule-of-law reforms, but rather incremental
improvements in the daily functioning of the current system.
iii.

Contributions to Society

In contrast to the common perceptions among U.S. respondents that corporate law firms
provide little public-interest value, the China sample presented a far more salutary sense of their
civic engagement, emphasizing contributions to national economic development. In the
interviews, these lawyers’ initial responses to questions about their professional goals
(职业目标) and the purpose of lawyers in society (律师的目的) did not generally begin with
statements on broad public contributions. They most commonly began by saying that they
aspired to be successful as lawyers. However, most of the Chinese respondents were expansive
when prompted with the question: “How important is it to you to make a public contribution?”
(为社会做贡献对你有多重要?) The elaborate and elevated ideals expressed in response to this
question revealed that these lawyers had previously reflected on these issues to a great extent.
For example, Li explained:
[Lawyers help] to resolve society’s contradictions (社会矛盾) and promote the
development of business for the benefit of the economy, and to promote the
perfection and development of law.
Li further emphasized that Chinese lawyers have a distinct capacity to contribute not only
through their daily practice but also through legislative work: “Chinese law feels very
incomplete. Not everything has specific regulations. Lawyers can participate in drafting and
interpreting laws drawing on their legal experience.”
Developing the national economy was the primary focus of respondents’ claims to public
contributions. These comments often specifically cited the international economic relations
facilitated by Shanghai corporate law offices. The China sample was near unanimous in
expressing the belief that, as one respondent phrased it, “the globalization of the economy is
good for the country.” Some respondents pointed to the work of more senior corporate lawyers in
their own firms and similar firms, who constitute the first generation of the modern private bar.
Respondents credited these senior attorneys with paving the way to the reform and opening up
(改革开放) of the post-Mao economy, including the emergence and radical expansion of the

middle class. These reflections locate respondents’ work in a patriotic tradition supporting
China’s ascension as a world power, although respondents were often quite modest about their
current contributions as junior attorneys. Zheng explained: “I would not say that my work makes
a great contribution to society, but I do think that business lawyers in general are helping to
improve the economy… [which is] the most important issue for our country.”
This emphasis on supporting the economy is well aligned with state policy and with the
Party’s longstanding claim to legitimacy on the basis of sustained national economic growth. But
respondents consistently clarified that their support of the economy was conducted in a manner
that distinctly reflects the values of the legal profession in contrast to the contributions of other
corporate professionals. These accounts underscored the professional obligations of lawyers to
supervise clients’ behavior, as Wu explained:
Business people are driven more by profit and willing to do unlawful things for
profit. But lawyers have to look out for the bottom line and the risks. Thus,
lawyers make sure that business people conduct themselves in a lawful manner,
while supporting their financial interests as well.
When asked about pro bono practice, most Chinese respondents explained that pro bono
was an important component of lawyers’ obligations to society. These accounts emphasized
future contributions, as young associates had few pro bono opportunities in their current
positions. Depictions of pro bono varied between domestic and foreign firms. Domestic firms are
legally required to take pro bono cases assigned to them by local bar associations. Some
respondents were aware of these requirements, but suggested that other lawyers in their firms
handled pro bono matters, in particular lawyers specializing in litigation, senior partners who
take high profile cases to gain prestige and political favor, and lawyers in flagging practices. Pro
bono may also be employed as a strategy in times of “organizational slack,” when firms have
spare resources and personnel (Sandefur 2007).
In contrast, foreign firms in China are not legally permitted to represent clients in paid or
pro bono capacities. Nevertheless, these firms generally have corporate social responsibility
initiatives that reflect their international pro bono commitments. Such charitable contributions
and volunteer work are common in domestic firms as well, constituting a “Chinese-style pro
bono” (Dong 2016). One domestic-firm respondent described his firm’s efforts to provide
clothing and education to rural children. Another respondent was working with her domestic firm
on a program to provide goats and calves to farmers. Three foreign-firm respondents described
rendering pro bono service on behalf of foundations and non-governmental organizations. Yet,
most Chinese respondents explained that their firms did not prioritize charitable work.
While formal pro bono opportunities were relatively uncommon, Chinese respondents
frequently described providing informal pro bono services to family and friends throughout their
extended social networks. Because there are still relatively few lawyers in China, respondents
found themselves in great demand. For example, in Zhang’s identity map below, he described
one of his core constitutive roles as being an “advice giver” (给予意见的人) for clients and for
his broader community.

Figure 2. Chinese Identity Map: Zhang

Zhang explained that providing pro bono legal advice for a great many people in his life
is a professional responsibility integrated into his sense of lawyer identity:
Because I practice labor law, many friends call me up with questions that deal
with law. When I’m not busy, I’ll give them advice. Maybe it is different from the
United States. People around here, if they hear you are a lawyer, or if they know a
person who knows you, they will directly give you a call. This kind of situation is
common, where it is a friend of a friend. If it is not too distant of a connection, I
usually can help them out.
In these accounts of “informal pro bono” (Mather et al. 2001, 138-56) or “de facto pro
bono” (Rhode 2005, 135), respondents typically emphasized a sense of personal obligation to
their family and friends. Often, however, these young attorneys noted that they lacked the legal
skills to help with many of the pro bono issues they encountered. This concern generally
suggests a mismatch between their training in international corporate law and the legal needs that
arise in informal pro bono matters. One respondent explained:
Especially if it is older people [who are asking for legal advice], they do not know
anything about specialization in the legal profession. Most of the work I do is
international law, business law, contract law, but most of what they ask me about
is divorce law, criminal law. I do not understand those areas…. I can just know
some basic legal principles. I can tell them, “Law is like this….” But there is a big
difference between the theory that I learned in school and the practice that they
need. I usually tell them they should really look for a more specialized lawyer….

If I have time I can help them look up legal information. But if I don’t have time I
can recommend a more specialized lawyer.
This emphasis on volunteer practice, even when respondents acknowledged limitations
on their effectiveness in providing pro bono services, suggests an internalized sense of civic duty
and engagement.
Nine of the 30 Chinese respondents stated that they hoped to find opportunities to engage
in rights protection (维权) cases later in their careers. These lawyers may find such opportunities
in the future. While popular media accounts often emphasize the small cadre of committed cause
lawyers in China, public-interest legal causes in China are perhaps more commonly served by
attorneys who take these cases on an occasional or part-time basis (Givens 2013). When asked
about their perceptions of full-time activist lawyers, respondents often expressed admiration for
these lawyers’ personal risk-taking, but suggested that their tactics and large-scale reform goals
are not realistic or pragmatic. Instead, the China sample generally recommended that lawyers
make smaller-scale, incremental public-interest contributions working within the current system.
iv.

Internal Constraints on Civic Professionalism

Although Chinese respondents emphasized their civic contributions in corporate law
practice, they also generally acknowledged that these contributions were very moderate. For
example, Qian suggested that she highly prioritized civic values in her work, but she offered a
very narrow view of her impact on society: “My main contribution is to share expertise with
clients and young lawyers.” Tang explained that rather than seeking to change law, lawyers
should strive to improve the functioning of the legal system: “The most important role for
lawyers in society is to inform people of the law.”
These narrow conceptions of civic impact, wherein lawyers share expertise and inform
people of law, are not only shaped by external constraints—associates’ lack of autonomy within
their firms and the broader lack of lawyer autonomy in the Chinese national context. These
accounts also suggest internal constraints, whereby young lawyers do not robustly push back
against limits imposed by the firm, the profession, and the state. Chinese respondents generally
reported feeling satisfied with their degree of civic engagement. They characterized this
incrementalist approach to civic professionalism in pragmatic terms as an affirmative strategy
for moderately developing the legal system and national economy. These themes can be
illustrated through the example of Hu. As quoted at the beginning of this article, Hu expressed a
particularly strong and broad commitment to his public contributions:
The value of my existence (存在的价值) depends on how much contribution I
can make to others, or to the society, or to the whole human race. This probably is
my core identity (最核心的身份) . . . . All other roles are just an extension of this
core role as a contributor (贡献者).”
Hu explained that being a contributor was his top priority in shaping his legal career, and
that his corporate law position was the best vehicle for these civic aspirations, noting: “I will
change jobs if another job allows me to make a greater contribution to society.” This

commitment was reflected in the centrality of the role labeled “contributor (贡献者)” in his
identity map (adjacent to and slightly overlapping with his “lawyer” role) (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Chinese Identity Map: Hu

Over the course of the interview, Hu narrowed this notion of civic contribution, clarifying
that he does not seek to change society: “As a lawyer, the core of what we can do is [promoting]
the rule of law. But of course I am not a radical activist (激进的行动者).” This notion of
promoting rule-of-law within the current system may reflect what many Chinese respondents
characterized as a pragmatic stance on the value of non-radical legal practice in a context where
lawyers generally have limited public impact. Later in the interview, Hu’s initial strong emphasis
on civic contribution seemed to waver:
Interviewer: Can you talk about your sense of purpose as a lawyer?
Respondent: If being a successful lawyer counts as a sense of purpose, then I’ll say
that.
Interviewer: Anything else? For example, what is the connection between being a
“contributor” and your career goals?
Respondent: Contributor, this, umm, maybe it is, not that I, because . . . contributor
is a broad idea, so it is not that you have an exact purpose that I want to be a
contributor. It is an element hiding in the background (一个隐藏在后面的因素)
when I engage in “decision making” [spoken in English]…. Maybe this is not an
“exact purpose” [spoken in English].

Interviewer: Do you have a broader sense of career purpose?
Respondent: A broader career purpose? [12 second pause] Perhaps all I can see
now is becoming a successful lawyer. (可能目前我能看到的就是做一个成功的
律师)
Following the long, twelve-second pause near the end of this excerpt, Hu’s narrative of
public contribution appeared to collapse. In a resigned tone (“Perhaps all I can see . . .”), his turn
to a careerist interpretation of professional purpose (“becoming a successful lawyer”) suggests a
narrow conception of civic motivation.
These internal constraints on civic expression were in some cases tied to respondents’
disinterest in politics. Only 14% (4 of 30) of the Chinese maps included what I coded as political
terminology. These roles were labelled party member, feminist (twice), and contributor (from
Hu’s map, cited above). While they did not generally identify with political roles, the Chinese
respondents did tend to identify with the positive (but moderate) political significance of their
work as corporate lawyers. In the U.S. sample, political terminology was much more common
under labels such as “Democrat,” “Republican,” “politics,” “activist,” “social justice.” U.S.
respondents generally reported that their political identities found little expression in corporate
law practice. In contrast, the Chinese sample generally reported finding satisfactory expression
of their moderate political goals.
The relative unimportance of politics in the China sample is reflected in Qian’s identity
map below. Although Qian is one of the few respondents to report party membership, she located
the “Party member” role on the periphery of her identity map.

Figure 4. Chinese Identity Map: Qian

Qian estimated that there were only ten party members in her firm’s office of roughly 100
lawyers. This lack of party engagement was explained by Qian as follows: “Young people are
not very interested in joining the Party. Law firms do not care about [party membership]…. You
have to pay the fee, just a few RMB to join meetings [of the firm’s party cell].” Another
respondent explained: “Party members are all technically included in the Party cell, but you are
allowed to not disclose that you are a Party member so that you do not have to pay the fee.”
Furthermore, no respondents mentioned membership in a Party youth league (共青团), whose
more than one-hundred million members range from ages 14 to 28. Just as Chinese respondents
generally did not prioritize involvement with the Party, they also expressed little interest in
strong anti-establishment politics (or at least they did not share such views in the interviews).
In sum, respondents in the China sample seemed committed to an affirmative, pragmatic
account of civic professionalism. They emphasized their roles as public contributors who serve
clients ethically, provide pro bono service, and advance the development of the economy and
moderate improvements in the legal system. These contributions were consistently framed in
state-aligned terms without liberal connotations of promoting democratic reforms, professional
independence, and moderating state power. While these respondents described an unexpected
sense of civic purpose in their careers, they did not appear to struggle against external constraints
on the expression of these civic ideals in practice. Instead they reported centrally integrated and
stable professional selves.

DISCUSSION
In the U.S. context, I find that many respondents bristled against constraints on the
expression of their civic ideals in corporate law practice. In contrast, Chinese respondents tended
to present a central and civically invested professional self. The Chinese corporate-lawyers-intraining framed these public contributions in moderate terms. Rather than struggling against
external constraints on civic expression, these lawyers generally appeared to adopt an affirmative
sense of civic purpose in their work without the associated frustration and role distancing found
in the U.S. sample.
The brand of civic professionalism found among the Chinese respondents likely draws on
a combination of domestic and foreign influences. These lawyers’ experience professional
socialization against a backdrop of foreign firms, foreign law, foreign clients, foreign LLM
education, foreign media images of lawyers, and foreign language. In the research interviews,
this global context was reflected perhaps most prominently in respondents’ regular use of
English terms in otherwise Mandarin conversation, as evident in the interview excerpts
throughout this article. When I asked respondents about this practice, they consistently explained
that they were not using English terms for my benefit as a non-native Mandarin speaker, but
rather they were following the everyday linguistic norms of their offices. Their English terms
covered multiple areas of professional life including law firm structure (e.g., “founding partner”),
practice (e.g., “conflict of interest”), business (e.g., “mutual fund”), and career considerations
(e.g., “work-life balance”), in addition to grammatical and casual words (e.g., “basically”). For
some legal terminology, respondents explained that they did not know the appropriate Chinese
words, or that the English terms were what came to mind first.
Yet, my findings suggest that these international influences in the Chinese corporate bar
should not be exaggerated. Chinese respondents portray a model of civic professionalism that is
distinct from the U.S. model. Even in the transnational corporate law sector, recent scholarship
suggests that the arrival of foreign law firms in China does not entail the transplantation of a
homogeneous global legal profession or the rise of “boundless connectivity” across national
boundaries and legal systems (Stern and Li 2016, 22; Liu 2008). Instead, the foreign-firm
presence in China largely consists of relatively small outpost offices that are often unprofitable
but serve a global branding function for multinational firms (Stern and Li 2016). Furthermore,
Chinese lawyers may outwardly present signs of American-style professionalism in symbolic
compliance with global norms while concealing local dimensions of legal practice (Liu 2008).
This continued divergence in the U.S. and Chinese legal professions is not only evidenced by
Chinese lawyers’ resistance to U.S. transplantation efforts, but also by Chinese innovations,
including firms that are moving away from collegial partnerships (Liu and Wu 2016).
My findings of cross-national variation in civic professionalism likely reflect countryspecific understandings of how professions function within a political order. U.S. professions are
tasked, under the traditional framework, with providing an independent source of public benefit
as a complement to and check on the power of the state. Thus, professional socialization serves
to inculcate lawyers with commitments to serving the public-interest in a bottom-up collective
manner. In these respects, the Chinese system differs fundamentally. Rather than an alternative
to the state, professions are folded into the state in explicit loyalty to and supervision by the

Chinese Communist Party. Recent Party initiatives have sought to socialize lawyers in a
“positive, affirmative vision of political participation” that is closely aligned with state programs
and ideologies (Stern and Liu 2020, 228). The economic value that corporate lawyers bring is
paramount in the state’s priorities, as the Party’s claim to legitimacy has largely relied on three
decades of sustained national economic growth. Furthermore, the Party’s legitimating narratives
have recently taken a “turn toward law,” celebrating and moderately strengthening legal
institutions, even while consolidating centralized power (Zhang and Ginsburg 2019). These
domestic mandates may help to explain why U.S. respondents struggle against constraints on
civic expression while Chinese accounts are more enthusiastic about moderately promoting
economic and legal development.
These findings push back against the notion of an increasingly homogenized global
professional identity among lawyers, and more specifically the image of a far-reaching diffusion
of American ideals to the Chinese corporate bar. The divergence between U.S. and Chinese
accounts suggests that civic professionalism should not be viewed as the exclusive domain of
liberal legal-political contexts. Instead, my findings point toward distinct U.S. and Chinese
modes of inhabiting the lawyer role.
The lived experience of civic professionalism in the U.S. sample may be frustrating and
deleterious for the wellbeing of some young lawyers. Many of these respondents accounts’ of
role distancing and disappointment in corporate law as a “sellout” career may contribute to the
large-firm sector’s well-documented struggles with job satisfaction, intrinsic work motivation,
and mental health (Dinovitzer 2004; Sheldon and Krieger 2014). The Chinese respondents
appeared to express greater intrinsic motivation, professional role centrality, and satisfaction
with their civic contributions. These lawyers’ claims that their work incrementally improves the
legal system are supported by the mandate of the Chinese legal profession to reinforce state
legitimacy. Given this context, it is not surprising that many of these lawyers take a favorable
view of their roles as civic professionals.
This cross-national variation in the formation of professional identity may suggest
country-specific constraints on lawyers’ ability to impact the public interest. In the U.S.,
detachment from the professional role can reflect inherent tensions in the profession’s ideal
image of lawyer identity, where the lawyer is expected to serve as a client agent while also
playing a robust role in legal and political development. This tension can lead lawyers to
disinvest from the civic dimension of their roles as corporate lawyers, and instead focus on exit
strategies to find a practice setting that offers more direct opportunities for public service. But
this frustration can also manifest as a bottom-up tension that can (in some cases) be productive
for promoting commitment to public service, particularly in large U.S. firms where young
attorneys have opportunities to shape pro bono practices. Thus, although an unstable and
constrained professional identity may raise troubling accounts of professional detachment, it may
also be associated with young lawyers’ proactive efforts to find and create civic engagement
within their firms.
The China sample’s more stable and integrated conception of civic professionalism could
be read as acquiescence to Chinese lawyers’ marginal role in the authoritarian order. These
respondents do not appear to urgently seek greater civic expression in their careers. The relative

absence of identity tensions in the China sample may suggest inertia in bottom-up movements
for reform via young lawyers. But this moderate approach to public-interest engagement could
instead be characterized as a pragmatic brand of civic professionalism, which promotes
incremental reforms in a context of heavy external constraints. This state-aligned understanding
of civic professionalism is perhaps central to what it means to be an effective public-regarding
lawyer in an authoritarian state. In this context, the professional self is stable, not struggling to
make dramatic shifts in one’s own self-concept or in the legal-political order. These lawyers
instead adopt a patient optimism that reflects state signals about the profession (Stern and Liu
2020, 242). They are perhaps a very moderate version of what Abel and Lewis (1989, 19)
described as “loyal opposition” lawyers who take a conservative approach to reform “within
strict limits.” Thus, although this moderate view of civic professionalism may serve state
interests, it is perhaps also an effective strategy for reform in a system where lawyers are
generally marginalized.
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